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SMALL-DONOR PUBLIC FINANCING IN
THE POST-CITIZENS UNITED ERA
MONICA YOUN*
With Citizens United v. FEC,1 the age-old problem of big

money in politics has reached a historic inflection point. In that
case, the Court overturned decades of law restricting corporate
campaign spending. In doing so, the Court re-ordered the priorities
in our democracy-amplifying special interests while displacing
the voices of the voters.
The 2010 midterm elections gave us a preview of what we can
expect in 2012 and beyond. In the first post-Citizens United
election, tens of millions of dollars from corporate treasuries were

spent to influence the electoral process, leaving voters and
grassroots groups consigned to the political margins. Many big
spenders-including corporate interests-were able to shield their
identities through gaping loopholes in federal disclosure law. In
fact, thirty-five percent of all independent spending was done in
the dark. 2
Indeed, a detailed study on political spending in the 2010
elections by New York City Public Advocate Bill de Blasio
illustrates the pernicious impact of Citizens United on
accountability and transparency in American politics. De Blasio's
report focused on the races where Citizens United had the most
pronounced impact-namely, elections to the U.S. Senate. After
* Brennan Center Constitutional Fellow at NYU School of Law. A version
of this Article was presented as hearing testimony to the Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights of the U.S. Senate Judiciary
Committee for their hearing on S. 750 on April 12, 2011. Fair Elections Now
Act: A Comprehensive Response to Citizens United, Hearing on S. 750 Before
the Subcomm. on the Const., Civ. Rts. and Hum. Rts. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary,112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Monica Youn, Brennan Center for
Justice). I would like to acknowledge the substantial contributions of my
colleagues Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Mark Ladov, Mimi Marziani and Elizabeth
Kennedy to the research and drafting of this Article.
1. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2001). This Article had been
submitted prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona Free Enter. Club
v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011), so this Article does not discuss that
decision.
2. BILL DE BLASIO, PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
CITIZENS UNITED AND THE 2010 MIDTERM ELECTIONS 9 (2010), available at
http://advocate.nyc.gov/files/12-06-lOCitizensUnitedReport.pdf.
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Senate races, De Blasio

*

"Anonymous or uncapped entities" (that is, organizations
taking advantage of the lifting of restrictions on political
spending by Citizens United) spent over $85 million on U.S.
Senate races-of which $65.4 million was spent on the top
ten races alone. 3

*

Over 30% of outside spending in these Senate races was
funded by anonymous donations. 4 These funds included
single donations totaling millions of dollars.

In other words, in the last federal election cycle, more
spending than ever was made by outside organizations that are
wholly unaccountable to voters-indeed, such organizations
routinely fail to publicly disclose the names of the corporations and
wealthy individuals who are bankrolling their campaigns. This
influx of secret money poses major risks of corruption, since such
independent spending has been used as a quid pro quo for
favorable political treatment for large spenders, as explained
below.
Moreover, an electoral system dominated by secret spending
threatens a crisis of accountability. Voters have lost faith that
their government is serving their interests. According to a recent
Gallup poll, "[a] record-low 36% of Americans have a great deal or
fair amount of trust and confidence in the legislative branch of
government, down sharply from the prior record low of 45% set
last year."5 Meanwhile, the public-by overwhelming numbersbelieves that our government's policies are more likely to benefit
large corporations and wealthy individuals than middle-class or
poor Americans.6 A 2010 poll by the Pew Research Center found
that while 70% of respondents agreed that government policies
helped large corporations, only 27% believed that government
policies helped the middle class.7 The increasing influence of
populist movements reflects a pervasive sense among the
electorate that our government is for sale to the highest bidder.
Former Justice John Paul Stevens foresaw this state of affairs
in his powerful Citizens United dissent, warning that American

3. Id. at 5.
4. Id. at 6.
5. Frank Newport, Trust in Legislative Branch Falls to Record-Low 36%,
GALLUP (Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/143225/Trust-Legislati
ve-Branch-Falls-Record-Low.aspx.
6. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, GOVERNMENT
ECONOMIC POLICIES SEEN AS BOON FOR BANKS AND BIG BUSINESS, NOT
MIDDLE CLASS OR POOR (2010), available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1670/

large-majorities-say-govt-stimulus-policies-mostly-helped-banks-financial-insti
tutions-not-middle-class-or-poor.
7. Id.
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citizens "may lose faith in their capacity, as citizens, to influence
public policy"8 as a result of that decision. As the days pass, it is
clear that Justice Stevens' prediction is being realized. In one
survey, 72% of respondents worried that the decision will
negatively impact the political process.9 At a moment of such clear
public disenchantment, there is a pressing need for reforms that
better effectuate the ability of voters to hold their representatives
accountable and that demonstrate that members of Congress are
accountable to the electorate, not to big-money backers. The
integrity of our electoral process is a necessary ingredient for a
healthy democracy.
Small-donor public financing systems, such as New York
City's public financing system and the congressional Fair Elections
Now Act (S.750 and H.R. 1404), are key to restoring accountability
to American democracy. Such systems are based on a multiple
match of mall donations, making it possible for candidates to run
competitive campaigns, while rewarding the grassroots outreach
that spurs greater citizen participation. In short, political
candidates can run competitive campaigns relying only on small
individual donations, not large infusions of special interest cash.
I.
CITIZENS UNITED RELEASED A TORRENT OF CORPORATE
SPENDING AND SECRETIVE SPECIAL-INTEREST MONEY INTO THE 2010

ELECTION-AND EVEN MORE IS EXPECTED IN 2012

In Citizens United v. FEC, decided in January 2010, the
Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment does not permit
distinctions between the electoral speech of corporations and that
of natural persons. In one swift stroke, the Court rendered
unconstitutional more than sixty years of federal law restricting
corporate electioneering expenditures, and overthrew the statutes
of twenty-two states that previously prohibited election spending
from corporate general-treasury funds.10 The Court reached this
radical result, and reversed decades of precedent, by rejecting the
long-standing doctrine that corporate electoral spending creates
unique risks of corruption and the appearance of corruption in the
political process. As recently as 2003, in McConnell v. FEC,11 the
8. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 974.
9. PUBLIC CITIZEN, 12 MONTHS AFTER: THE EFFECTS OF CITIZENS UNITED
ON ELECTIONS AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 18 (2011),

availableat http://www.citizen.org/documents/Citizens-United-20110 113.pdf.
10. The federal ban on direct corporate spending in elections goes back to
the 1907 Tillman Act, which prohibited corporate contributions in federal
campaigns (it was assumed to cover "independent expenditures" too). In 1947,
the Taft-Hartley law made explicit that corporations and unions could not
directly spend their treasury funds on electioneering. Congress-every time it
has passed a law to deal with this-only has strengthened this prohibition.
11. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003) (holding
unconstitutional amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
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Supreme Court had reaffirmed this holding. The Supreme Court
made this abrupt about-face without any new legal or factual
basis; as Justice John Paul Stevens observed in dissent, "the only
relevant thing that has changed. . .is the composition of this
Court." 12 The Court simply assumed that independent
expenditures posed no risk of corruption, whether or not such
independent expenditures were funded from corporate treasuries.
Overall, Citizens United gave an unequivocal green light for
unlimited corporate spending in elections. A corporation may now
spend its shareholders' money on direct electoral advocacy. This
game-changing decision has already made its effects felt in the
2010 midterm elections, and the reverberations of Citizens United
will only grow in the years to come.
Since Citizens United, we have seen very little direct spending
on political ads by for-profit corporations. According to the Center
for Responsive Politics, during the 2010 election cycle only three
corporations ran their own independent expenditures.13 Instead,
wealthy corporations and individuals are taking advantage of
Citizens United to funnel political spending through political
committees such as super PACs and other nonprofit organizations.
Undisclosed spending has reached record-breaking levels even in
the first post-Citizens United election, and political operatives are
gearing up to flood the 2012 elections with cloaked campaign cash.
A. PoliticalSpending by Corporationsand Wealthy Special
Interests Has Increased Exponentially Since Citizens United
As noted above, corporate cash swamped federal, state, and
local elections in 2010, relegating voters to a position at the
margins of political power.14
According to the Campaign Finance Institute, independent
spending and electioneering in Congressional elections
grew to $280.2 million in 2010.15 This was more than
and the Communications Act of 1934, which placed restrictions on campaign
spending).
12. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 942 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
13. Michael Beckel, Influx of Corporate Political Cash Followed Pivotal
Federal Court Decision, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Mar. 25, 2011, 5:40 PM),
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/03/influx-of-corporate-politicalcash.html ("These three companies-DGS Construction, Penneco Oil and
Central Arizona Block Co.-spent a combined $54,500 to aid ... four federallevel Republican candidates.").
14. See, e.g., Michael Luo, Money Talks Louder than Ever in Midterms, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/us/politics/08don
ate.html.
15. Press Release, Campaign Fin. Inst., Non-Party Spending Doubled in
2010 But Did Not Dictate the Results (Nov. 5, 2010), available at
http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/10-11-05/Non-PartySpendingDoubled
ButDidNotDictateResults.aspx (follow "Table 1"hyperlink).
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double the $119.9 million spent by outside groups on
Congressional elections in 2008, and more than five times
the $53.9 million spent by outside groups in 2006.16
*

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce alone spent more than $32
million on federal electioneering communications during
the 2010 election cycle, more than any other outside
organization.' 7 This nearly doubled the amount the
8
Chamber spent in the 2008 cycle.'

This state of affairs was not solely due to Citizens United,

since even prior to Citizens United, a series of deregulatory

decisions had opened up loopholes in federal campaign finance
regulation.' 9 Citizens United, however, put the stamp of Supreme
Court approval on corporate campaigning, so that the effect of the
decision extended far beyond its narrow holding. Campaign
finance lawyers have described Citizens United as a "psychological
green light," granting corporations a greater comfort level with
inserting themselves into the heart of political campaigns. 20 We
can only expect these trends to worsen in the upcoming 2012
election cycle, as other interests follow the paths blazed by the
early adopters of corporate electioneering. Indeed, prominent
special interests have already announced plans to smash spending
records in the 2012 election cycle. 21
Such high levels of corporate campaign spending carry a
16. Id.
17. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, U.S. Chamber of Commerce: Outside
Spending Summary 2010, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/out
(last visited Sept. 12,
sidespending/detail.php?cmte=C30001101&cycle=201
2011).
18. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, U.S. Chamber of Commerce: Outside
Spending Summary 2008, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/ou
tsidespending/detail.php?cmte=C30001101&cycle=2008 (last visited Sept. 12,
2011).
19. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (holding
were
restrictions on electioneering communications
that federal
unconstitutional unless such communications were the "functional equivalent"
of express advocacy).
20. Luo, supra note 14.
21. See, e.g., Eliza Newlin Carney, Democrats Join the Battle, NAT'L. J.
(Feb. 27, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/rules-ofthe-game/democrats-join-the-battle-20110227 (last updated Feb. 28, 2011, 9:20
PM); Tom Hamburger & Matea Gold, Some Democrats Favor a Shift to More
Outside
Campaign
Spending,
L.A.
TIMES,
Nov.
4,
2010,
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/04/nation/la-na-money-politics-20101104;
Andy Kroll, Will Secret Spending Divide Democrats?,MOTHER JONES (Nov. 15,
2010,
3:00 AM), http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/1 1/obama-outsidespending-2012-election; Peter H. Stone, Democrats Desperately Seek Their
Own Rove: Democrats Try Catching GOP in Outside Money Chase,
HUFFPOST POLITICS (Mar. 14, 2011, 8:44 AM), http://www.h
uffingtonpost.com/2011/03/14/democratic-fundraisingmoneychase-n_835243.html.
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substantial risk of corruption, as explained infra, Section II.A.1.
Corporate campaign spending has historically involved attempts
to purchase quid pro quo favorable political treatment, often at
taxpayers' expense.

B. Citizens United Has ExacerbatedPreexistingProblemsof
Undisclosed Spending by Wealthy Special Interests
The Citizens United majority wrongly assumed that current
disclosure laws allow both the electorate and corporate
shareholders "to make informed decisions and give proper weight
to different speakers and messages." 22 However, that vision of
transparency and free flow of information bears no relation to
what occurs in real life. 23 Most corporations are not required to
disclose political spending, either to the general public, or to their
own shareholders and corporate boards. 24 Contrary to the Court's
expectations, recent elections have shown a sharp decline in the
disclosure of political expenditures.
*

Among groups making "electioneering communications"
(campaign advertisements that mention a candidate),
disclosure of donors has dropped from 96.8% in 2006, to
49.3% in 2008, to a scant 34% in 2010.25

*

making independent expenditures,
Among groups
disclosure of donors dropped from 96.7% in 2006, to 83.3%
in 2008, to 70% in 2010.26

These numbers are hardly surprising: under the current laws,
corporations can hide their political spending in several different
ways.
First, it is perfectly legal for businesses that want to influence
federal elections to funnel money through nonprofit trade

22. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916.
23. For example, independent expenditures-the very type of political
expenditures unleashed by Citizens United-are underreported in most states.
As one report explained, "holes in the laws-combined with an apparent
failure of state campaign-finance disclosure agencies to administer effectively
those laws-results in the poor public disclosure of independent expenditures.
The result is that millions of dollars spent by special interests each year to
influence state elections go essentially unreported to the public." LINDA KING,
NAT'L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS, INDECENT DISCLOSURE: PUBLIC
ACCESS To INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE INFORMATION AT THE STATE LEVEL 4

(2007), http://www.followthemoney.org/press/R eports/200708011.pdf.
24. See CLARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, CORPORATE CAMPAIGN SPENDING:
GIVING SHAREHOLDERS A VOICE 10 (2010), available at http:/Ibrennan.
3cdn.net/54a676e481f019bfb8_bvm6ivakn.pdf

("As U.S.

law

stands

now,

corporate managers can spend corporate money on politics with- out notifying
shareholders either before or after the fact and they can make this political
spending without any authorization from shareholders.").
25. KING, supra note 23, at 4.
26. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 9, at 11.
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associations such as the Chamber of Commerce to avoid
disclosure. 27 For example, in a 2000 Michigan senate race,
Microsoft used the Chamber of Commerce to fund $250,000 in
attack ads against a candidate; this undisclosed donation would
have remained hidden but for a newspaper investigation that
exposed Microsoft's contribution. 28
Similarly, America's Health Insurance Plans (AHIP), a trade
association, was found to have solicited $10 million to $20 million
from six leading health insurers, and funneled this money secretly
to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to underwrite anti-health
reform attack ads. 29 Although businesses must reveal their
identities to the Federal Election Commission if they spend large
amounts of money directly, they can give money to trade
associations and other nonprofits anonymously. These nonprofits,
in turn, only have to disclose the source of their advertising money
if the donors specified that their contributions were intended for
political ads-a requirement that almost all sophisticated players
avoid.30
Second, corporations and wealthy individuals often cloak
their political spending by utilizing conduit organizations to avoid
disclosing their true identity. As the Supreme Court observed in
its 2003 decision in McConnell v. FEC, veiled spending is not a

27. TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 24, at 12.
28. See BRUCE F. FREED AND JAMIE CARROLL, CTR. FOR POLITICAL
ACCOUNTABILITY, HIDDEN RIVERS: How TRADE ASSOCIATIONS CONCEAL
CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING, ITS THREAT To COMPANIES, AND WHAT
SHAREHOLDERS CAN Do 13 (2006), http://www.politicalaccountability.n
et/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/il932 (explaining that Microsoft made
these "unregulated 'soft money' contributions" to pay for ads attacking the
candidate (Debbie Stabenow (D)) who was challenging the incumbent Spencer
Abraham (R) for the Michigan Senate seat); John R. Wilke, Microsoft Is Source
of "Soft Money" Funds Behind Ads in Michigan's Senate Race, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 16, 2000.
29. Brad Jacobson, Exclusive: How CorporationsSecretly Move Millions to
Fund Political Ads, RAw STORY (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.rawstory.com/v3/
2010/02/04/exclusive-trade-groups-swiss-bank-accounts-campaign-finance/.

30. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, the Dark
Election of 2010 and Why Tax-Exempt Entities Should Be Subject to Robust
Federal Campaign FinanceDisclosure Laws, 16 NEXUS CHAPMAN'S J. OF L. &
PUB. POL'Y 59, 61 (2011) ("If for-profit corporations are purposefully using
non-profits to hide the true source of their funds, then it is possible that the
degree of disclosure required of non-profits in the future may have an impact
on whether for-profits give money to ideological and politically active nonprofits."). Although trade associations must report contributions received from
other corporations to the Internal Revenue Service, the document itself
remains confidential and is not made available to the public. See generally
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (I.R.S.), INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990 RETURN
OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX 4 (2010), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990.pdf (providing a step=by-step account of
how non-profits disclose income).

The John Marshall Law Review

626

[44:619

new problem.3 1 But Citizens United gave corporations and other
political spenders more cover to hide behind nonprofits and trade
associations than ever before. So while spending surged in 2010,
the public's knowledge about that spending plummeted. For
example:
*

In September 2010, a mysterious group called Concerned
Taxpayers of America started running ads targeting Rep.
Peter A. DeFazio (D-Ore.). 32 It was only after the
organization's FEC filings were made public that the truth
came to light. The Concerned Taxpayers of America turned
out to be only two concerned taxpayers-a privately-owned
construction corporation based in Maryland, and a New
York hedge fund executive-who poured nearly $1 million
into this super PAC.33

*

The American Future Fund-based in Des Moines, Iowais a 501(c)(4) non-profit corporation that spent over $9.6
million in the 2010 election cycle, ranking fifth among
independent spenders nationwide. 34 The group paid for a
variety of ads targeting candidates on issues such as the socalled "Ground Zero Mosque." Media reports suggest,
however, that the organization was in fact funded by
ethanol interests, and that its true agenda was to target
members sitting on energy and agricultural policy
committees.3 5 Because the American Future Fund was
organized as a 501(c)(4), it has no obligation to disclose its
funders publicly, and the interests and identities of its
funders may never be known for certain.

This lack of accountability endangers the entire legislative
process by allowing corporate special interests to hide behind
31. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 128, 197 (citing record evidence that
corporations commonly veil their political expenditures with misleading
names such as "The Coalition-Americans Working for Real Change" (a
business organization opposed to organized labor) and "Citizens for Better
Medicare" (funded by the pharmaceutical industry)).
32. Karen Tumulty, An Anonymous Group Tries to Ignite a Sleepy

Congressional Race, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2010, 9:55 PM), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp.yn/content/article/2010/09/24/AR2010092406
362.html.
33. Dan Eggen, Concerned Taxpayers of America Supported by Only Two
Donors, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2010, 6:35 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com

/wp-dyn/content/story/2010/10/13/ST2010101306021.html; FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION (F.E.C.), SUMMARY REPORT - 2009-2010 ELECTION CYCLE:
CONCERNED TAXPAYERS OF AMERICAN (2010), available at http://query.nictus

a.com/cgi-bin/cancomsrs/?_10+C00488437.
34. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 9, at 9-10.
35. Editorial, Secret Money in Iowa, N.Y.

TIMES, Oct.

26,

2010,

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/27/opinion/27wedl.html; Jim Rutenberg, Don
Van Natta, Jr. & Mike McIntire, Offering Donors Secrecy, and Going on

Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/12/us/po
litics/12donate.html.

2011]

Small-Donor PublicFinancing

627

political campaigns that claim to speak for the general welfare. As
explained above, this hidden spending impairs the ability of voters
to make informed decisions on election day. Inadequate disclosure
of corporate spending similarly limits the ability of legislators and
policy makers to evaluate the true interests behind lobbying
campaigns. Take one example: Recently, the nonprofit Institute for
Liberty-claiming an affiliation with the Tea Party movementlaunched an extensive campaign against a proposed tariff on paper
imported from Indonesia. 36 The Institute's campaign invokes the
Declaration of Independence to defend the rights of foreign
corporations and attacks American businesses, unions, and
environmentalists who have criticized Indonesian paper
manufacturers. Suspiciously, this campaign coincided with a
massive public relations push by Asia Pulp & Paper-a huge
Indonesian paper manufacturer. But, because the Institute for
Liberty is not required to disclose its donors, it is impossible to
know whether Asia Pulp & Paper is actually funding this effort.
Our chronic lack of transparency prevents citizens and legislators
from knowing whether this purported grassroots campaign is
actually being funded by corporate special interests and may lead
voters to be misled in their choices at the ballot box.
C. Citizens United Led to the Creationof "SuperPACs"
Citizens United also led directly to the creation of massive
new independent expenditure vehicles nicknamed "super PACs."
After Citizens United, the D.C. Court of Appeals extended the
Supreme Court's logic to strike down contribution limits imposed
on federal PACs that only engage in independent spending (as
opposed to donating directly to candidates' campaigns). 37 In other
words, these independent expenditure "super PACs" can take in
and spend unlimited amounts, including monies from corporate
treasury funds.
Such super PACs can function as "shadow parties," sharing
personnel, office space, and strategies with each other, but without
being subject to the federal campaign finance laws' restrictions on
political parties and candidates. 38 Thus, super PACs offer a readymade vehicle to circumvent federal contribution limits which place
a ceiling on individual contributions and bar corporate
contributions. As Republican political strategist Karl Rove, the
founder of American Crossroads-perhaps the best known super
36. Mike McIntire, Odd Alliance: Business Lobby and Tea Party, N.Y.
TIMES,

Mar. 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/us/politics/311ibert

y.html.

37. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
38. Jonathan D. Salant & Kristin Jensen, The Ties that Bind GOP
Fundraisers, BUS. WEEK (Oct. 21, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.business
week.com/magazine/content/10_44/b4201034335872.htm.
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PAC-told Fox News, "What we've essentially said is, if you've
maxed out to the Senate committee, the congressional committee,
or the R.N.C. and you'd like to do more, under the Citizens United
decision you can give money to American Crossroads."3 9 Indeed,
Rove's two organizations-American Crossroads and Crossroads
GPS-raised $71 million in the 2010 cycle. During August 2010
alone, American Crossroads raised $2.4 million from just three
billionaire donors. 40 Such unlimited contributions to outside
spending groups raise the risks of corruption and the appearance
of corruption that federal contribution limits were enacted to
prevent.
Moreover, according to Politifact, the Pulitzer Prize winning
fact-checking website of the St. PetersburgTimes, super PACS and
other outside groups "overwhelmingly spread[] exaggerations and
falsehoods."41 If a candidate or political party were to have such a
dismal record for accuracy, voters could hold that candidate or
party accountable at the ballot box. However, with such distortions
attributable only to supposedly independent outside groups, voters
are powerless to react as our electoral discourse is flooded with
misleading and deceptive advertisements funded by undisclosed
backers.
D. The Outlook for 2012 Is Bleak
These troubling trends will continue-and likely worsen-in
2012. Observers predict that outside political spending may double
again during the upcoming election cycle. 42 Candidates are already
gearing up for the most expensive federal election cycle in
American history.43 Both political parties have announced plans to
include super PACs as a major component of their 2012
fundraising strategies. American Crossroads and Crossroads GPS
have announced a target of $120 million for the 2012 cycle. 4 4
39. Jeffrey Toobin, Commentary, Money Talks, NEW YORKER, Apr. 11,
2011, http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2011/04/11/110411taco-talk_t
oobin.
40. Justin Elliott, Billionaires Give 91 Percent of Funds for Rove-tied
Group, SALON.COM (Sept. 20, 2010, 6:30 PM), http://www.salon.com/news/poli
tics/warroom/2010/09/20/rove-group-more-millionairedonations.
41. Bill Adair, 'Super PACs' and Other Groups Have Poor Record for
Accuracy, POLITIFACT.COM (Oct. 14, 2010, 12:16 PM), http://www.politifa
et.com/truth-o-meter/article/2010/oct/14/super-pacs-and-other-groups-havepoor-record-accur/.
42. See Shane D'Aprile, Midterms May Have Just Tested the Waters of
Campaign Finance Ruling, THE HILL (Nov. 13, 2010, 7:00 AM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/fundraising/129005-ultimate-impact-of-outsi
de-campaign-spending-remains-to-be-seen.
43. See, e.g., Glenn Thrush, Barack Obama Reelection Starts Cash Chase,
POLITICO (Mar. 5, 2011, 4:55 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/03
11/50643.html.
44. Brian Montopoli, Karl Rove-Linked Group Seeks to Raise $120 million
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Democratic strategists have announced their own super PACs,
such as the "Majority PAC," which will operate in tandem with
issue advocacy nonprofits (organized under 501(c)(4) of the tax
code), enabling big donors to make contributions in secret. 45 Some
have warned that-given the amount of secret money inundating
our elections-there is a serious likelihood of future political and
ethical scandals of Watergate-sized proportions. 46 All in all, the
full impact of Citizens United is almost certainly still yet to come.
II.

SMALL-DONOR PUBLIC FINANCING CAN HELP RESTORE
ACCOUNTABILITY TO ELECTIONS

Public financing generally, and small-donor based public
financing in particular, can help restore our democracy, even in
the face of the torrent of special interest money post-Citizens
United. Most importantly, by allowing candidates to run viable
campaigns through reliance on small donations and public funds
alone, public funding programs restore integrity and
accountability to the electoral process. By doing so, public
financing reduces the threat that big money will have a corrupting
influence on the political process. Moreover, public financing
programs-particularly small-donor public financing systemsincentivize political participation by candidates and by voters,
thus promoting electoral debate and competition and allowing
more of the electorate to have a stake in our campaigns.
A. Public Financingof CampaignsReduces Corruption
1. Reducing Actual Corruption
Our system of private financing for congressional races
carries a significant risk of corruption. Members who receive
significant donations from particular special interests may feel
compelled to support their biggest donors' interests, creating a
quid pro quo where legislative decisions are implicitly exchanged
for campaign funds. 47 As Senator John McCain (R-Arizona)
explained in defense of the enactment of federal soft-money
restrictions, "it would be hard to find much legislation enacted by
any Congress that did not contain one or more obscure provision
that served no legitimate national or even local interest, but which
for 2012 elections, CBS NEWS (Mar. 1, 2011, 11:56 AM), http://www.cbsnew
s.com/8301-503544162-20037742-503544.html.
45. Carney, supra note 21.
46. Albert Hunt, Watergate Return Inevitable as Cash Floods Elections,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 17, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/201010-17/more-cash-blots-out-sunlight-in-u-s-elections-albert-hunt.html.
47. CTR. FOR GOV'TAL STUDIES, INVESTING IN DEMOCRACY 6-7 (2003)
[hereinafter CGS STUDY], available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/
10207/bitstreams/231.pdf.
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was intended only as a reward for a generous campaign
supporter."4 8 In addition to generating favors for special interests,
large donations can lead to inaction on legislation that would
benefit the public good. As Senator McCain explained, "There's a
terrible appearance when the Generic Drug Bill, which passes by
78 votes through the Senate, is not allowed to be brought up in the
House shortly after a huge fundraiser with multimillion dollar
contributions from the pharmaceutical drug companies who are
opposed to the legislation." 49 Former Senator Russ Feingold (DWisconsin) similarly warned of the appearance of quid pro quo
corruption that emerges when "a $200,000 contribution [was]
given 2 days after the House marked up a bankruptcy bill by
MBNA."s 0
Indeed, business leaders readily acknowledge that corporate
political spending is intended as a quid pro quo to win influence
and favorable treatment, rather than to merely express an opinion
on political issues. This is why corporations routinely spend money
supporting both major parties, and why corporate political
spending generally flows to the party in power and tracks changes
in the partisan make up of legislatures. 5' A recent poll of 301
business opinion leaders confirmed that most believe that
corporate political spending serves a non-ideological function:
*

*
*

Fifty-five percent said that corporate America engages in
campaign spending "to gain access to influence the
legislative process." 52
Only 16% said that corporate political spending was
intended "to promote a certain ideological position."53
And, 17% of business leaders complained that corporate
political donations were primarily necessary "to avoid
adverse legislative consequences." 54

This problem is fostered by political candidates, whose
reliance on big-money donations leads them to reinforce the
understanding that corporate campaign spending translates into

48. 143 CONG. REC. S9994-02 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997) (statement of Sen.
John McCain), 1997 WL 593557, at *S10000 (Westlaw).
49. McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 515 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting statement of
Sen. John McCain).
50. Id. (quoting statement of Sen. Russell Feingold).
51. Brief of the Committee for Economic Development as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 11-12, McComish v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806
(2011) (Nos. 10-238 & 10-239), 2011 WL 661709, at *11-12 [hereinafter CED
Amicus Brief].
52. CHERYL KORN, ZOGBY INT'L, COMM. FOR ECON. DEv., OCTOBER
BUSINESS LEADER STUDY 8 (2010), available at http://www.ced.org/images
/content/issues/moneyinpolitics/2010/zogbypoll2010.pdf.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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political access.55
Many business leaders believe that the pressure for
corporations to enter the political fray has increased since Citizens
United. According to an October 2010 poll by the Committee for
Economic Development, "48% of business leaders state that the
level of pressure placed on them to make political contributions
has increased since 2008, with 28% saying it has 'increased a
lot."'56 The same poll found that 29% of business leaders describe
the amount of money solicited as "excessive" and another 22% say
it is "high, but not excessive."5 7
Our current campaign finance system is particularly
problematic where lawmakers on key committees benefit from
campaign spending by the very interests they are charged with
regulating. For example, during the passage of the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act in 2003,
Rep. Walter Jones (R-North Carolina) decried the House vote as
"political Sodom and Gomorrah on Capitol Hill."58 As Members
entered the House chamber, lobbyists representing prescription
drug companies who had given millions in political contributions
stood at the entrance to the chamber, pressuring legislators for
their support.59 In the aftermath of the extremely close vote,
allegations of bribery swirled, as one of the deciding votes claimed
he had been offered campaign funds in exchange for his support.60
Direct political contributions are not the only cause of
potential corruption in our current campaign finance system.
Independent political spending, of the type that has been
unleashed by Citizens United, can also create substantial risks of
corruption. Indeed, independent campaign ads-or even the threat
of unleashing such an ad-may be a more direct route than
lobbying for special interests to pressure elected officials. Such
campaign ads allow outside spenders to threaten politicians'
ability to remain in office. For example, in 1998, a Native
American tribe offered to undertake a substantial independent
spending campaign on behalf of a Kansas Congressman in an
extremely close reelection race, if the Congressman would switch
his position on-and subsequently support-legislation that would
55. CED Amicus Brief, supra note 50, at 11.
56. Id. at 17.
57. Id.
58. A Look at H.R. 1826 and the Public Financing of Congressional

Campaigns: Hearing on H.R. 1826 Before the Comm. on H. Admin., 111th

Cong. 48 (2009) [hereinafter H.R. 1826 Hearing] (statement of Rep. Walter
Jones), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbnam
e=11 1_house-hearings%20&docid=f:5271 l.pdf.
59. Id.

60. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Inquiry Set on Bribery Claim in Medicare Vote,
Mar. 18, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/18/politics/

N.Y. TIMES,

18BRIB.html.
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allow the tribe to build a casino.6 1
Corporations may be able to use their new ability to run
campaign attack ads to coerce elected officials into compliance
with a particular agenda, even if the corporations never have to
make good on their threats by actually running the ads. One
egregious example arose in North Carolina and is discussed at
length in Judge M. Blane Michael's dissenting opinion in the 4th

Circuit case of North CarolinaRight to Life, Inc. v. Leake:
The campaign waged in North Carolina by the independent group
Farmers for Fairness (Farmers) provides another example of the
corruptive influence of independent expenditures. Farmers created
advertisements directly opposing certain legislative candidates.
Instead of simply running the advertisements during election time,
Farmers scheduled meetings with legislators and screened the
advertisements for them in private. Farmers then explained that,
unless the legislators supported its positions, it would run the
advertisements that attacked the candidates on positions unrelated
to those advocated by Farmers.. . .The record reveals that Farmers
did not discuss its central issue, deregulation of the hog industry, in
its advertisements. Instead, it threatened and coerced candidates to
adopt its position, and, if the candidate refused, ran negative
advertisements having no connection with the position it
advocated. 62
As this example demonstrates, the Citizens United decision
gives corporations a new and powerful weapon-whether they ever
actually use this weapon is, arguably, beside the point. A
corporation's explicit or implied threat to use its general treasury
funds as a political war chest places great pressure on legislators
and can be expected to distort the decision-making of elected
officials in ways that will often be difficult to trace.
Public financing can help break this vicious cycle of
corruption. When special interest political spending carries less
weight, legislation can be considered on its merits rather than by
its fundraising consequences. As former Arizona governor Janet
Napolitano explained with regard to that state's prescription drug
bill:
If I had not run [using public financing], I would surely have been
paid visits by numerous campaign contributors representing
pharmaceutical interests and the like, urging me either to shelve
the idea or to create it in their image. All the while, they would be
wielding the implied threat to yank their support and shop for an
opponent in four years. [Instead,] I was able to create this program
based on one and only one variable: the best interests of Arizona's

61. Defendant FEC's Proposed Findings of Fact at
288-97,
SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010), No. 1:08-cv-00248-JDB.
62. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 335 (4th Cir. 2008)
(Michael, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

633

Small-Donor PublicFinancing

2011]

senior citizens.63
Similarly, the Center for Governmental Studies, which has
studied campaign finance programs across the nation, has
catalogued numerous other instances (in New Jersey, Maine, Los
Angeles and elsewhere) where candidates and legislators endorse
public financing for this very reason: public financing enables
elected officials to place their constituents' interests above special
interests. 64

2. Reducing Perceived Corruption
As the Supreme Court has often reaffirmed, "Of almost equal
concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the
impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public
awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of
large individual financial contributions." 65 Public polling confirms
that the current system of private fundraising fosters the
appearance of corruption, eroding trust in government and leading
the public to believe that political spending buys political favors.
*

A Greenberg-McKinnon national survey in February 2010
found that 79% believed members of Congress are
"controlled" by those who fund their campaigns as opposed
to just 18% who thought voters were in charge. 66

*

A Rasmussen national survey in August 2010 found that
70% of voters believe that "most members of Congress [are]
willing to sell their vote for either cash or a campaign
67
contribution."

A shift to a system of public financing could help restore this
lost faith in government. Already, participants in state public
financing systems have seen a change in public opinion. "Overall
people are excited about [public financing] because they feel that
their particular legislator will not be tied to special interest dollars
and that means a lot to them," said Leah Landrum Taylor, an

63. Why

Fair Elections?, RHODE ISLANDERS

FOR FAIR

ELECTIONS,

http://www.fairelectionsri.org/benefits.php (last visited Sept. 12, 2011).
64. Brief for Center for Governmental Studies as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 11-12, McComish v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (Nos. 10238 & 10-239), 2011 WL 639368, at *11-12 (U.S. Feb. 17, 2011) [hereinafter

CGS Amicus Brief].
65. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (emphasis added).
66. STAN GREENBERG ET AL., GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER, STRONG
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: GOOD POLICY, GOOD POLITICS 2 (2010),
available at http://www.greenbergresearch.com/articles/2425/5613_Campaig
n%20Financ e%20Memo Final.pdf.
67. Toplines - Campaigns - August 7-8, RASMUSSEN REPORTS, http://www
.rasmussenreports.com/%20public content/politics/questions/pt survey questi
ons/august_2010/toplinescampaigns-august_7 8-2010 (last visited Sept. 12,
2011).
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Arizona state representative who participated in her state's public
financing program.68 Even candidates who chose not to participate
in the state's program have noticed the shift. In a recent GAO
survey, an anonymous nonparticipating Arizona candidate wrote,
"I believe the program has helped restore the public's faith in the
integrity of candidates. Hopefully, many other states, and
eventually Congress, will adopt public funding of elections."69
Public financing can ease voters' distrust and suspicion of their
elected officials, fostering greater trust in the government.
B. Public FinancingReduces Elected Officials' Dependence on
Large-DonorFundraisingand Encourages
Constituent-FocusedCampaigns
Under the existing system of private campaign contributions,
fundraising monopolizes a candidate's time, with elected officials
spending many of their hours "dialing for dollars" or attending
closed-door fundraisers. For instance, Representative Chellie
Pingree (D-Maine) reported spending nearly twenty hours a day
on the phone, trying to coax donations, not from her constituents,
but from wealthy out-of-state interests. 70 Senator Tom Harkin (DIowa) recently estimated that, "[o]f any free time you have, I would
say fifty per cent, maybe even more," is spent on fundraising.71
Senator Lamar Alexander (R-Tennessee) has stated that
fundraising "sucks up time that a senator ought to be spending
getting to know other senators, working on issues."72 On average,
federal congressional candidates in contested elections report
73
spending about thirty-four percent of their time raising money.
Crucially, public financing permits candidates to spend less
time fundraising, allowing those who are elected officials to spend
a greater percentage of their time legislating in their constituents'
interest. Indeed, a 2003 University of Maryland study confirmed
that candidates who participate in robust public funding programs
spend significantly less time raising money than other

68. CGS STUDY, supra note 46, at 4.
69. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-453, CAMPAIGN FINANCE

REFORM: EARLY EXPERIENCE OF Two STATES THAT OFFER FULL PUBLIC
FUNDING FOR POLITICAL CANDIDATES 122 (2003), available at http://www.

gao.gov/new.items/d03453.pdf.
70. H.R. 1826 Hearing, supra note 57, at 43 (statement of Rep. Chellie
Pingree).
71. George Packer, The Empty Chamber: Just How Broken is the Senate,
NEW YORKER, Aug. 9, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/08/09/
100809fa fact packer?currentPage=all.
72. Id.

73. Peter Francia & Paul Hernnson, The Impact of Public Finance Laws on
Fundraisingin State Legislative Elections, 31 AM. POLITICS RESEARCH 520,
531 (Sept. 2003), availableat http://apr.sagepub.com/content/31/5/52 0.short.
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candidates.7 4 Another study recently concluded that candidates
with full public financing are able to devote ten percent more of
their time to direct engagement with voters compared to
traditional candidates. 75
And, candidates around the country report that public
financing improves their ability to connect with voters. For
example, Albuquerque, New Mexico Councilor M. Debbie
O'Malley, an incumbent who ran as a publicly funded candidate in
2007, stated that with public funding, "you do a lot more outreach
and the voters have a lot more ownership of the election process,
because many of them have given $5 to help get a candidate
qualified."7 6 Running for Governor of Arizona, Janet Napolitano
had a similar experience. "[Public financing is] the difference
between being able to go out and spend your time talking with
voters, meeting with groups,. .. traveling to communities that
have been underrepresented in the past, as opposed to being on
the phone selling tickets to a $250 a plate fundraiser. . . ."77
In short, in a system with less emphasis on large
contributions, the focus returns to the candidate's ability to
connect with his or her potential constituents.

C. By Incentivizing GrassrootsFundraising,Public Financing
IncreasesPoliticalParticipation
Notably, the goal of small-donor public financing is not to "get
money out of politics," or any such unrealistic objective. Instead,
by using small-donor matching funds to incentivize grassroots
fundraising, such programs can broaden and deepen the donor
pool and allow new voters to have a stake in the electoral process.
As the former New York City Campaign Finance Board Chair
Frederick A.O. ("Fritz") Schwarz, Jr. has put it:
In their understandable disgust with large contributions, many
reformers missed a big point-and a big opportunity. Political
contributions are not inherently tainted. Political contributions do
not always raise the specter of corruption. Large ones may. But
small financial contributions are a natural part of a healthy
participatory democracy. New York's system should be a model for
74. Id.
75. Michael Miller, Clean Elections

vs. PoliticalSpeech, THE MONKEY CAGE
(Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.themonkeycage.org/blog/2011/03/23/clean-elect
ions.vs political-s/; see also Ezra Klein, The Importance of Campaign-Finance
Reform in One Graph, WASH. POST, (Mar. 23, 2011, 05:58 PM ET),

http://www.washingtonpost.comlblogs/ezra-klein/postthe-importance-ofcampaign-finance-reform-in-one-graphl2011/03/18/ABka8iKBblog.html
(discussing clean-election funds and their impact in campaigning).
76. CGS Amicus Brief, supra note 64, at 16 (quoting MOLLY MILLIGAN,
CTR. FOR Gov'TAL STUDIES, PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN ALBUQUERQUE:
CITIZENs WIN WITH CLEAN MONEY ELECTIONS 23 (2011)).
77. CGS STUDY, supranote 46, at 3.
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reform nationwide.78
The vast majority of political contributions currently come
from a small segment of the wealthiest Americans, particularly in
federal congressional campaigns. In 2008, U.S. Senate candidates
received only 14% of their funding from donors who gave an
aggregate of $200 or less, while U.S. House of Representative
candidates received only 8% of their funding from this pool of
small donors.7 9 Moreover, Senate candidates received only 23% of
their funding from donors who gave less than $1000, while House
candidates received only 17% of their funding from donors who
gave less than $1000.80 For incumbents, the reliance on small
donors is even lower.8 1
A shift to public financing-particularly, moving to a system
that matches small donations with public funds-can dramatically
increase the influence of small donors and thus widen the scope of
political participation. Small-donor participation in Arizona's
gubernatorial races increased after the implementation of the
state's public financing system: "a study of Arizona gubernatorial
contributions found a 3-fold increase from 11,234 in 1998 to 38,579
in 2002, with the majority of contributors earning $50,000 or
less." 82 In Connecticut, most state legislative candidates who
participated in the public financing program received money from
a larger number of individual donors in 2008 than the predecessor
candidate of the same party and district in 2006, the last year
without the program.83 Similarly, under New York's system, which
features a multiple match of small donations:
*

The number of overall contributors and the number of
small donors has increased. 84 In particular, the number of
contributors has risen dramatically-by an average of
35%-since the enactment of the multiple match. In 1997,

78. Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Foreword to ANGELA MIGALLY & SUSAN
Liss, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, SMALL DONOR MATCHING FUNDS: THE NYC
EXPERIENCE (2010), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/8
116be236784cc923fiam6benvw.pdf. Mr. Schwarz is senior counsel at the
Brennan Center.
ELECTION

79. ANTHONY J. CORRADO ET AL., CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., REFORM IN AN AGE

OF NETWORKED CAMPAIGNS 20 (2010), available at http://www.cfinst.org/bo
oksjreports/Reform-in-an-Age-of-Networked-Campaigns.pdf.
80. Id. at 21.
81. Id. at 20.
82. AMS. FOR CAMPAIGN REFORM, FAIR ELECTIONS: STATE TRACK RECORD
OF SUCCESS (2010), available at http://www.acrreform.org/wp-content/uploads
/2010/12/Fair-Elections-State-Track-Record.pdf.
83. Press Release, Campaign Fin. Inst., CFI's Review of Connecticut's
Campaign Donors in 2006 and 2008 Finds Strengths in Citizen Election
Program but Recommends Changes (Mar. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/10-0302/Analysis-ofConnecticutCitizenElectionProgram.aspx.
84. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 78, at 2.
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the last year before the enactment of the multiple match,
72,082 donors gave to participating candidates. In 2001, the
first year of the multiple match, the number of donors
skyrocketed to 146,949 donors.85
*

*

Participating candidates rely on more donors, and on more
small donors, than do nonparticipants. In 2009, the typical
participating City Council candidate enlisted the support of
almost triple the number of small donors than did her
nonparticipating counterpart; the median number of small
donors for participating candidates was 269 and 91 for
nonparticipants. In 2005, participants garnered support
from more than double the small donors than
nonparticipants; the median number of small donors for
participating candidates
was 239 and 98 for
nonparticipants.86
In 2009, the average contribution to a participating City
Council candidate was $199, less than one-third the $690
average contribution for non-participating candidates. In
2005, the average contribution to participating City Council
candidates was $321, significantly lower than the $804
average contribution for non-participants.8 7

Over half of the individuals who contributed to city
campaigns during the last three election cycles were first-time
donors.88
Including more voters in the electoral process naturally leads
to a larger, more diverse pool of donors. For instance, the share of
donor activity has risen in New York City's outer boroughs; in
2009, donor activity increased almost six-fold in Flushing, a
heavily Asian-American neighborhood that is home to Queens'
Chinatown. 89 Similarly, a scan of the occupations of 2009 donors to
New York City elections reveals a surprisingly diverse group:
amidst the traditional lawyers and businesspeople, contributors
included a significant number of artists, administrative assistants,
barbers and beauticians, cab and bus operators, carpenters, police
officers, students, nurses, and clergy.90
Just as it creates new contributors, public financing can also
lead to a more diverse candidate pool. When extensive private
fundraising is no longer a barrier to entry, running for office
becomes accessible to community leaders with popular support,

85. Id. at 12 & 34 n.94.
86. Id. at 15 & 35 n.113.
87. Id. at 15 & 35 n.114.

88. CGS Amicus Brief, supra note 64, at 19 (citing NYC CAMPAIGN FIN. BD.,
NEW YORKERS MAKE THEIR VOICES HEARD: A REPORT ON THE 2009
ELECTIONS 104-05 (2009)).
89. Id. (citing NYC CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., supra note 88, at 109-10).
90. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 78, at 13.

The John Marshall Law Review

638

[44:619

but who may lack big-money backers.9 1 Thanks to Maine's system
of public financing, for example, challengers have run "who never
thought they'd have the chance to represent the people who are
their friends and neighbors-young people, people from minority
communities, people who thought they would never be able to
afford the cost of running for public office." 92 Indeed, once they
remove the nearly prohibitive costs of candidacy, states with
public financing inevitably see a rise in non-traditional candidates.
For example:
*

The number of women running for office in Connecticut is
at an all-time high, and many credit public financing with
allowing them to run.93

*

In Arizona, the number of Native American and Latino
candidates nearly tripled in just two election cycles after
public financing was implemented.94

*

In New York City, the system has been tied to a series of
"firsts" in New York City politics: The City's first AfricanAmerican mayor, David Dinkins, participated in the
program, as have the City Council's first DominicanAmerican, first Asian-American, and first Asian-American
woman members.95

On a national level, the presidential public financing system
has enabled candidates to translate widespread popular support
into viable-and, often ultimately successful--campaigns. Since
Watergate, three incumbent presidents have been defeated by
challengers who benefited from the presidential public financing
system, with the largest beneficiary of public financing being the
insurgent candidacy of Ronald Reagan.96
In sum, small-donor public financing systems provide critical
incentives to broaden and deepen political participation in
elections.

91. See CGS Amicus Brief, supra note 64, at 21-24.
92. H.R. 1826 Hearing, supra note 57, at 46 (statement of Rep. Chellie
Pingree).
93.A Look at H.R. 1826 and the Public Financing of Congressional
Campaigns: Hearing on H.R. 1826 Before the Comm. on H. Admin., 111th

Cong. 206 (2009) (statement of Jeffrey Garfield, Exec. Dir., Conn. State
Elections Enforcement Comm'n), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.go
v/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 11 -house-hearings &docid=f:52711.pdf.
94. CGS Amicus Brief, supra note 64, at 24.
95. MIGALLY & Liss, supra note 78, at 21.
96. Brief for Anthony Corrado, Thomas Mann and Norm Ornstein as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 16-17, McComish v. Bennett, Nos. 10-238
& 10-239, 2011 WL 661708, at *16-17 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2011).
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D. Publicly Financed CandidatesCan Remain Competitive Even
in the Post-Citizens United Era
Multiple states and jurisdictions have had great success with
their public financing systems. Indeed, a shining example has
operated on the national level for more than thirty-five years: the
presidential public financing system. It was adopted after the
Watergate scandal as an effort to address the corruption of the
Nixon administration and the abuses of the 1972 presidential
election.97 And it has succeeded in combating corruptionpresidential elections since Watergate have been free of large-scale
corruption scandals.
Even in the post-Citizens United world of increased, often
independent
spending, public financing
corporate-backed,
continues to be a viable option. Questions have been raised about
the efficacy of public financing program in an environment of
unlimited corporate independent expenditures.9 8 But the
experiences of jurisdictions with public financing demonstrates
that, as long as such systems offer candidates sufficient funds to
run viable campaigns, publicly financed candidates can run
competitive and successful races even in the face of high levels of
hostile independent spending.
*

Maine has never banned corporate-funded independent
expenditures in state elections. Thus, candidates
participating in the state's 10-year-old public financing
system have regularly conducted campaigns in the midst of
heavy independent
spending from the National
Organization for Marriage and other well-financed outside
groups. 99 Despite this, the vast majority of Republican and
Democratic candidates participate in public financing. In
the 2010 state senate elections, 94% of Republican
candidates, and 82% of Democratic candidates ran their
campaigns on public funding. In state house campaigns,
89% of Democratic candidates and 68% of Republican
candidates participated. 100

97. 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C § 431, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001,
9031).
98. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CAMPAIGN FINANCE
POLICY AFTER CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION: ISSUES
AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS (2010), available at http://assets.openers.co

m/rpts/R41054_20100201.pdf; Colin McEnroe, The Extreme Court, HARTFORD
COURANT (Jan. 22, 2010, 8:55 a.m.), http://blogs.courant.comcolin_m
cenroe to wit/2010/01/the-extreme-court.html.
99. See Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 723 F. Supp. 2d 245, 251-52 (D.
Me. 2010) (highlighting the contributions of the National Organization for
Marriage).
100. MAINE COMM'N ON GOv'TAL ETHICS AND ELECTION PRACTICES, MAINE
CLEAN ELECTION ACT: OVERVIEW OF PARTICIPATION RATES AND PAYMENTS
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Arizona's 13-year old public financing system has also
enjoyed a strong bipartisan majority of candidates
participating in public financing. Again, publicly financed
candidates there have run successful campaigns despite
hundreds of thousands of dollars in opposing independent
expenditures. 10 1 In 2008, 72% of Democrats and 50% of
Republicans used public financing in their primary
elections, and 82% of Democrats and 52% of Republicans
102
used public financing in the general election.

Publicly financed candidates have also been able to compete
and win in the nation's costliest municipal races-in New York
City and Los Angeles, as well as San Francisco.
*

In New York City in 2009, 66% of the general election
candidates and 93% of primary candidates financed their
elections through the City's program. "These rates have
been consistent for over a decade. Indeed, nearly every
credible candidate participates: in 2009's contest, the Public
Advocate, the Comptroller, all five Borough Presidents, and
all but two of the 51 City Council candidates who were
103
elected to office participated."

*

In San Francisco, 45% of candidates in 2008 and 48% of
candidates in 2010 participated in the public financing
program. Of the candidates who won their elections, 71%
were publicly financed in 2008, and 60% were publicly
financed in 2010.104

*

In Los Angeles, between 1993 and 2005, more than 75% of
all citywide candidates have chosen to participate in the
City's public matching funds program, and 83% of all
Council candidates have participated. "A sizable majority,
or 71 percent, of those elected to City office between 1993
and 2005 have had the advantage of public funding in their
05
campaigns."

2000-2010 1 (2011), available at http://www.maine.gov/ethics/pdf/publica
tions/2010_MCEA Summary.pdf.
101. In 2006, gubernatorial candidate Janet Napolitano faced $430,000 in
directly opposing independent expenditures, yet still won the election. Jan
Brewer was similarly successful in 2010, facing $200,451 in directly opposing
independent expenditures. See Campaign Finance Reporting Database,
OFFICE OF THE ARIZ. SEC'Y OF STATE, http://www.azsos.gov/cfs/CandidateSu
mmarySearch.aspx (demonstrating expenditures against candidates).
102. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CAMPAIGN FIN. REFORM:
EXPERIENCES OF Two STATES THAT OFFERED FULL PUBLIC FUNDING FOR
POLITICAL CANDIDATES 30-31 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.ite

ms/d10390.pdf.
103. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 78, at 10.
104. S.F. ETHICS COMM'N, REPORT OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS PUBLIC
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In sum, there is little doubt that public financing systems can
succeed in providing sufficient funds to viable candidates so that
candidates who wish to participate can compete vigorously and
win.106

III.

CONCLUSION

As the Supreme Court explained in Buckley, a public funding
system aims, "not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather
to use public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and
participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a selfgoverning people." 107 The Court further noted that:
[Tihe central purpose of the Speech and Press Clauses was to assure
a society in which "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" public
debate concerning matters of public interest would thrive, for only in
such a society can a healthy representative democracy flourish.
Legislation to enhance these First Amendment values is the rule,
not the exception. Our statute books are replete with laws providing
financial assistance to the exercise of free speech. 108
Public financing promotes "uninhibited, robust, and wideopen public debate" not only through direct subsidies for speech
but also through more indirect means. Instead of relying on the
deep pockets of special interests, public financing makes it
possible for candidates to run a viable, competitive campaign
through grassroots outreach alone, leaving them indebted to no
one but their constituents. In this way, a public financing system
serves key anti-corruption interests, combating "both the actual
corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the
erosion of public confidence in the electoral process through the
appearance of corruption." 09 Moreover, "[b]ecause the electoral
process is the very 'means through which a free society
concrete
into
political speech
translates
democratically
governmental

action,'. . .

measures

aimed

at

protecting

the

integrity of the process ... tangibly benefit public participation in
political debate."110
Small-donor public financing systems, such as the

FINANCE REFORM IN THE CITY OF Los ANGELES 15 YEARS AFTER PROPOSITION

H 59, 83 (2006), available at http://ethics.lacity.org/pdfl2005ElectionStudy/

Investing-in thePublic_Trust.pdf.
106. Michael J. Malbin & Peter W. Bruscoe, Small Donors, Big Democracy:
New York City's Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States 20

(Campaign Fin. Inst., Working Paper, 2010), available at http://www.cfin
st.org/pdf/state/NYC-as-a-ModelMalbin-BrusoeRIGDec2OlO.pdf.
107. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 92-93.

108. Id. at 93 n.127 (citations omitted).
109. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. at 136 (2003) (internal quotation omitted).
110. Id. at 137 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401
(2000) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
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presidential primary public financing program and those in
several states, further First Amendment values by directly
enlarging public discussion, preventing corruption and its
appearance, providing candidates an alternative to special interest
money, and encouraging candidates to reach out to a broader
grassroots network of constituents. In these and many other ways,
small-donor public financing systems advance the core values of
the First Amendment-more political participation and more
speech. As the Supreme Court declared in Citizens United, these
values are at the heart of our constitutional democracy: "[I]t is our
law and our tradition that more speech, not less, is the governing
rule.""n

111. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911.

